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Abstract: This paper summarizes the critical importance of the Cerrado savannah biome in Brazil and
examines key ways in which large-scale agriculture, in particular large-scale soy farming, threatens water
security and increases socio-ecological stress. It connects agribusiness expansion to the globalized
meat industry by defining how complex economic relationships result in deforestation on a massive
scale. It describes how this radical change in land cover has led to changes in rainfall patterns that are
associated with extended drought periods and analyzes how these critical water shortages jeopardize
socio-economic health beyond the immediate region. Further, it explicates how intensified transgenic soy
farming and other pesticide-heavy crop production contributes to rising public health crises associated with
carcinogen-contaminated water and food sources. Lastly, it identifies emerging trends that suggest how
agribusiness corporations and governments may be legally ascribed moral responsibilities for maintaining
socio-ecological health of the biome. The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of the human
dimensions of environmental issues and their impacts and reframe conservation social science discourse in
regard to protection of land and water resources in the region.
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1. Introduction
The Cerrado is one of the most species-rich savannahs in
the world [1,2] and a hotspot of biodiversity [3], yet less than
3% of its area is fully protected [4,5]. It is the second largest
biome in South America and is the central biome that con-
nects to four of the five other Brazilian biomes—the Amazon,
Caatinga, Atlantic Forest and Pantanal. It occupies a con-
tinuous region of more than two million km2, covers 23% of
the country, and spans nine states [6]. The headwaters of
three of South America’s major river basins and several large
aquifers are located within its territory. These hydrographic re-
gions play a critical role in the distribution of water resources
throughout the South American continent [7].
Large-scale agricultural producers are reshaping the Cer-
rado on an extraordinary scale [8]. The expansion and in-
tensification of the soy industry is markedly accelerating
[4]. From 2000 to 2014 the agricultural area of the Cerrado
expanded by 87%, mainly for soybean production, which
increased by 108% during this period [9]. The biome al-
ready accommodates 40 million cattle [10] and cultivates
more than fifteen million hectares of soy—90% of all agricul-
ture in the Cerrado (2013/14 harvest) [9]. Soy production
is predicted to continue to increase, in large part to provide
agro-industrial feed for the global meat industry [11], particu-
larly to meet demands in China [12,13] and to produce edible
oil, biodiesel and industrial products [11,14]. The expansion
and intensification of soy, as the main agricultural commodity
c© 2019 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). librello
produced in the region, is contributing to changes in regional
hydrology [15] that effects water security [16] and impacts
the socio-environmental health of the region.
The expanding “ecological hoofprint” [17] of China and
Europe’s mega-meat industry is a primary driver of soy pro-
duction on the Cerrado. Yet, understanding how a chain
supermarket-bought steak on a European dinner table neg-
atively impacts the ecological health of a Brazilian biome
is not straightforward but comprises of a myriad of com-
plex components that are part of a market-based global
agri-food industry [18] of which soy is emblematic.
Large-scale production of soy is associated with loss, de-
terioration and changes in the Cerrado’s biophysical founda-
tions. It negatively impacts on native vegetation, soil, ground-
water, hydrological patterns, and other elements essential
to socio-ecological security [19]. These issues are not only
attributable to soy but are interwoven into a transnational
landscape that connects to other forms of grain and live-
stock production and is supported by pro-growth federal and
state policies engineered by a powerful agribusiness lobby
disproportionally represented in Brazilian Congress [20].
Transnational corporations significantly influence insti-
tutionalized decision-making at a national level [21]. The
rapid conversion to genetically modified (GM) key commod-
ity crop production (soy, corn, and cotton) in the last two
decades has dominated the political ecology of national
agriculture, to affect the dynamics of farming, trade, and
legislation. The introduction of GM soy in 2008 has acceler-
ated an already expanding industry [22]. In Brazil, 96% of
soy is genetically modified (2016 harvest) [23]. Soy has now
become the largest crop cultivated (by area) in the country,
with an estimated 33.9 million ha planted in 2016/17 (to
produce 114.1 million tons), 74% of which was to supply
the export market, with China as the chief importer, followed
by Europe [24].
Soy expansion has destroyed natural habitats over wide
areas of both the Amazon and Cerrado, and has been ac-
companied by massive transportation infrastructure projects
that include industrial waterways, railway lines and road net-
works that transport commodities to port [25]. They further
infringe into the biome by providing access for other private
neo-extractivist activities [26] to expand.
Along with the expansion of GM soy has come
a dramatic increase of agrotoxin use (chemical pesti-
cides/herbicides), the technologies of which belong over-
whelmingly to Monsanto (73.05%) followed by multination-
als Dow AgroScience / DuPont and Syngenta (2013) [27].
GM soy has dramatically changed farming on the Cerrado,
not only in a material sense, but at an ideological level, as it
is progressively transformed into a de-spatialized commod-
ity that is divorced from negative socio-ecological account-
ing [11,28]. As discussed later in this paper, large-scale soy
production is justified by calculating dollar value commodity
profit over tradable carbon stocks [29], while environmen-
tal health impacts caused by pesticide contamination [30]
and the effects on changes in regional hydrology patterns
[31] are given inadequate policy attention, though they are
increasingly significant problems. Thus, in closing, the pa-
per signposts emerging ways forward that suggest how
government and agribusiness may be held more legally
responsible for their impacts on the Cerrado.
2. Need
By 2050, food production is predicted to increase by ap-
proximately 70% worldwide, and by 100% in developing
countries [32]. The demand for soy, much of it for live-
stock feed [33,34], and the large-scale mechanized meth-
ods used to produce[11] and transport it [35], are supported
by a global free market system [36,37] tied to a pro-growth
economic development model in critical need of revision
[38–44]. Over the coming decades, this model will result
in climate changes that are expected to contribute to water
scarcity [45] and declines in yields and price increases for
key commodity crops such as soy, which will no longer be
viable to cultivate in the region [46].
The Cerrado is part of an agricultural frontier that teeters
on an ecological ‘tipping point’ as a result of intense pres-
sure from agribusiness [47,48], much of it in order to expand
soybean production [49]. The consequences are enor-
mous and interdependent, and at the same time unique
to the biome. Ongoing examination of the environmental
stressors the Cerrado faces are of crucial importance in
order to understand what is necessary to ensure its socio-
ecological survival. Investigations into hydrological insta-
bility, safeguards for human health and wellbeing, and the
deepening of discourses that critique the global free market
food system and interrogate the culture of agro-extractivism
are all essential to decouple discussions of sustainability
from an economic model dependent on perpetual growth
[39,44,50,51]. This refocusing of development discourse
must also include strategies whereby government and cor-
porate entities are legally compelled to act in the capacity
of socio-environmental stewards over the lands and waters
that they use and control.
3. Aims
The aim of this paper is to:
a) contribute to existent conservation social science dis-
course [52,53] analysis by analyzing key ways in
which large-scale agriculture on the Cerrado (in partic-
ular soy farming) limits socio-environmental security
and impacts water resources;
b) frame ecological integrity as a moral obligation which
may be legally applied to aid in reversing socio-
ecological loss moving forward.
4. Scope
This paper investigates the environmental impact of large-
scale soy farming in relation to key vulnerabilities by de-
lineating how water security, in particular, is threatened by
agribusiness. It defines the role that the Brazilian soy in-
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dustry plays by building a narrative that relates land use to
water resource strain, and linking it to a larger suite of land
use practices that are transforming the Cerrado and effect-
ing broader security issues. It focuses on soy as a primary
and emblematic component of an agribusiness framework
that is invested in building political and socio-economic per-
ceptions and attitudes that value the Cerrado exclusively
for its commodified worth.
The paper offers considerations for a pathway forward
by proposing how emerging legal approaches can be used
to intervene in governance to strengthen conservation ini-
tiatives beyond the industry-led, market-based instruments
currently in place [54].
Many topics are critical to informing the industry respon-
sibility debate. Though each is beyond the scope of this
paper to investigate in depth, collectively they form an ethi-
cal basis for suggesting an alternative development pathway
forward. They include: addressing environmental justice
struggles faced by those that are dispossessed by or ex-
posed to violence by a policy landscape that supports neo-
extractivist industries [55,56] and unethical labor practices
[57]; interrogating conservation initiatives which are shaped
almost exclusively by an array of market-based instruments
such as subsidized credit lines, tax incentives and trade-off
schemes, most of which favor large-scale landholders and
privatization initiatives [3]; suggesting more rigorous trans-
parency in multi-directional global commodity supply chains
[58]; dispelling a neoliberal land transformation imaginary
[59]; and indicating emerging ways in which environmen-
tal protection responsibilities may be legally ascribed to
government and industry in the 21st century.
This paper may be of relevance to practitioners and
theorists working in the fields of the conservation social
sciences, specifically in areas of environmental sociology,
land management, political ecology, development ethics,
climate change litigation and environmental geography, with
an interest in agribusiness, land use and water resources,
but who are unfamiliar or less familiar how sustainability
challenges relate to the Cerrado biome.
5. Methods
The methodological foundation for this paper is grounded in a
critical discourse analysis [60] of existing Cerrado literature that
identified common themes of drought, preservation, conserva-
tion, sustainability, deforestation, degradation, carbon, contami-
nation, changes in hydrology, pesticides, water security, environ-
mental threats, conservation policy, land conflicts, social inequity,
political ecology, socio-ecological loss and climate change im-
pacts. Productivist discourses were identified with themes con-
cerning higher production levels, economic gains, expansion,
intensification, transportation, GDP, yields per tonne, corporate
name brands (e.g. Monsanto, Amaggi, Cargill), technological
production methods, irrigation, agribusiness policy, growth and
sustainable development. Analysis of these key themes form
what is essentially a review of Brazil’s agricultural, social and
environmental policies [51] as they relate to the Cerrado.
6. Literature Review
Producing soy on the Cerrado depends on resource ex-
ploitation that results in substantive socio-ecological loss,
effects water resources, and contributes to hydrological
change. An array of scholars provide a solid scientific foun-
dation for explicating these environmental concerns. The
Union of Concerned Scientists (2016) provides a summary
of the critical ecological importance of the Brazilian Cer-
rado and how soy is a driver for deforestation [2]. Veldman,
et al. (2015) [61] argue the need to protect non-forest
ecosystems such as the Cerrado. Grecchi, et al. (2013)
[62] and Beuchle, et al. (2015) [63] expose how Cerrado
land use has changed due to agriculture, and Spera et
al. (2016) [64] analyzes how these changes affect water
recycling. Rudorff, et al. (2015) [65] geospatially analyze
crop dynamics over the last fifteen years to expand under-
standings of land cover patterns and changes, and Jepson
and Brannstrom (2010) [66], and Gusso et al. (2017) [67]
explicate economic patterns and influences that lead to
high-input agricultural expansion in the biome. Arantes et
al. (2016) [68] analyze current carbon and water reserves
and indicate what future changes are likely to occur. Batlle-
Bayer et al. (2010) [69] review changes in the carbon sink
due to land use conversion in the region, while Brack and
Bailey (2013) [70] discuss agricultural commodity supply
chains (including soy) by tracing the interrelationships of
international trade, consumption, and deforestation.
Other findings, including conservation studies by Car-
ranza et al. (2014) [71] and Espı´rito-Santo et al. (2016)
[72], are foundational to understanding how ecosystem in-
tegrity connects to issues of human security. The Critical
Ecosystem Partnership Fund’s Ecosystem Profile: Cerrado
Biodiversity Hotspot (2017) [3] prepared by Sawyer et al.,
gives a broad, multi-dimensional overview of the biome and
the issues, activities and organizations involved in determin-
ing its health. Insights presented by authors that compile
the articles of the special issue: Soy Production in South
America: Globalization and New Agroindustrial Landscapes
(2016) [73] published by the Journal of Peasant Studies,
and the collected volume Soy, Globalization and Environ-
mental Politics in South America (2018) [74], both edited
by Oliveira and Hecht, provide some of the critical under-
pinnings for this paper. Finally, Wendy Wolford connects
environmental justice issues to large-scale agriculture and
the social impacts of soy in the region [75].
7. An Overview of Soy & its Implications for Water
With the aid of chemical fertilizers, the Cerrado is able to
produce mega-scale commercial yields of corn, sugarcane,
cotton, and above all, soy—the crop that is currently en-
abling the production of massive quantities of meat and
dairy globally. Approximately 80% of the world’s soy is pro-
cessed for animal feed, much of it in Brazil to be sold to
export markets [24,76]. Many other global consumer prod-
ucts, from processed foods to cosmetics, also exist thanks
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to a ten-fold growth in the production of Brazilian soy in
the last 50 years [77,78] So much of the South American
continent has been subjected to agricultural expansion by
the GM soy industry that cultivation of the crop has been
referred to as a new form of Latin American colonization
[79]. The conversion of native Cerrado into fields of soy has
enabled Brazil to become the world’s largest exporter of
soy—and for the first time the largest producer, overtaking
the US for the 2018 harvest [80]. Soy accounted for almost
40% of Brazil’s agricultural exports by value in 2014 [81],
giving large producers significant influence over economic
and political decision-making.
Up to 70% of the Cerrado’s vast tapestry of native plants
and trees are connected via a unique and complex root
system that has developed over eons and is crucial for eco-
logical, carbon, and water security [3,82]. The magnitude
and velocity with which the Cerrado’s native vegetation is
being deforested due to agricultural expansion is a major
contributor to Brazil’s key emissions sources [3] and a fun-
damental cause of water stress throughout the region due
to the changes it catalyzes in hydrological patterns [64].
The large-scale loss of native vegetation and its replace-
ment by shallow root system crops such as soybeans has
resulted in rainwater being less able to infiltrate the ground
because the deep root system needed to absorb the water
and feed the water table is no longer there. This results in
stormwater erosion and affects lake bottom sedimentation
processes that inhibit surface water from penetrating to the
Cerrado’s aquifers [83].
Spera’s remote sensing study (2016), which mapped
land-use change across the biome between 2003 and 2013,
revealed that cropland agriculture increased from 1.2 to 2.5
million ha during this period, and that 74% was a conse-
quence of expansion into previously intact Cerrado vegeta-
tion. According to the study, this has led to decreased water
recycling via evapotranspiration over each consecutive year
during this timeframe, demonstrating that in 2013, Cerrado
croplands recycled 3% less (14 km3) water than if the land
had been covered with native vegetation [64]. Even though
evidence suggests that double-cropping can mitigate evapo-
transpiration losses [64], and some tree cover and wooded
lands have been recovered [63], overall acute net losses in
native vegetation due to growth in agribusiness enterprises
in the region means increased competition for water supplies
and escalating water conflicts. Between 2011 and 2016,
Brazil saw a 150% increase in water conflicts, totaling 172
major water conflicts which affected 44,000 families [84].
Deforestation in the biome, notably from soy, has im-
paired stream-valley systems due to erosion [85] and in-
creased streamflow in small catchment areas [86], a sce-
nario that may eventually lead to a critical reduction in ac-
cessible groundwater stores [87]. Further, pesticides have
been detected in water catchment areas under intensive
agricultural use, with extremely high-peak concentrations
exceeding national and European water quality limits in
several cases [30]. With the relaxation of riparian require-
ments on private properties [88], and the increase of land
use expansion and intensification expected to continue, par-
ticularly in the northeastern and western regions where
less annual rainfall and severe droughts are projected, the
leaching risk and migration of agrotoxins are expected to
increase [30].
The most aggressive deforestation is occurring in the
northeast region of Matopiba (an area comprising of the
Cerrado portions of the Brazilian states of Maranha˜o, To-
cantins, Piauı´ and Bahia). Matopiba is one of the poorest
regions in Brazil and the last expanse of the biome that is
being converted to large-scale mechanized agriculture [89].
The conversion has been catalyzed by a development plan
[90], devised by Brazil’s Ministry for Agriculture, to advance
the large-scale production of soy and other agricultural com-
modities for export. Even though land prices in the Cerrado
have increased rapidly since 2009, land in Matopiba re-
mains less expensive than other areas of the biome, which
makes it attractive for agricultural development. In 2014,
16% of soy planted in the Cerrado was planted in Matipoba
[81]. The expansion of privatized agribusiness interests is
also resulting in excessive deforestation and water pollu-
tion, which suggests even more strain will be put on water
resources in the coming decades [91,92]. Communities are
already struggling to sustain local, traditional small-scale
farming, with conflicts related to water justice issues pro-
liferating as a result of the private appropriation of water
supplies by agribusiness [84].
The majority of Brazil’s national emissions are caused
by changes in land use, much of it on the Cerrado, espe-
cially in Matopiba, where between 2010–2013, large-scale
cropland conversion contributed 45% of total Cerrado forest
carbon emissions [93,94]. This has implications for hydrol-
ogy on both a global scale (due to the effects on climate
change) and across the biome [4]. On a regional scale,
remote sensing shows that during the Cerrado’s dry season,
evapotranspiration from agricultural land averages 60% less
than what occurs from land covered with native vegetation.
As cropland continues to devour native vegetation, the de-
crease in dry season water recycling may eventually result
in delaying the onset of the Cerrado’s wet season, which is
responsible for the majority of rains the region receives [64].
72% of Brazil’s total water consumption in 2010 was
used for irrigation [95]—yet only a small fraction (624,000
ha) [96] of soybean acreage is irrigated, accounting for
12% of the country’s total harvested irrigated crop area
for 2006 (last statistics available) [97]. As agriculture in-
tensifies, however, so too does its irrigation needs. In the
Cerrado, growing numbers of large-scale, technologically-
equipped farmers with center-pivot and self-propelled irriga-
tion systems are already maximizing the use of the region’s
numerous perennial rivers and streams [97] in a trend that
is predicted to magnify. According to one report, the FAO
projects that irrigation in Brazil may increase by up to 65%
by 2024 [98]. Though efficient irrigation technology reduces
water usage per hectare, continued industry growth through
expansion and intensification amplifies pressure on water
resources [99] and exasperates environmental justice in-
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equities [75,100] by impacting water allocation, quality and
reserves that may increase vulnerability to climate shocks.
8. Water: A Cycle of Diminishing Capacity
The Cerrado supplies water to six of the country’s eight
largest watersheds, the whole of the Pantanal, eight of
the country’s twelve river basin districts, and three of the
world’s largest and oldest aquifers. The Guaranı´ Aquifer
is the second largest aquifer in the world. It lies beneath
the sovereign territory of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and
Uruguay, and has a storage volume of 40,000 km3—enough
to supply an estimated 11 billion people for 100 years with
100 liters of water per person per day [101]. 71% of the
aquifer (840,000 km2) lies underneath 9.8% of Brazilian
territory, yet Brazil accounts for approximately 90% of all
Guaranı´ water extraction [102]. In contrast, a quarter of
Uruguay is located above the aquifer, yet it uses less than
5% of what Brazil consumes [103]. The South American epi-
center of soybean cultivation occurs in the same quadrant
of countries that intersect over the Guaranı´, with Brazil tak-
ing lead as top producer, followed by Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay, in a region known as the United Soy Republic.
Transboundary tensions around the Guaranı´ Aquifer have
seen a regression in cooperation over the last several years
[104]. In relation to agriculture, contamination from diffuse
sources such as pesticides, and groundwater exploitation
that impede the aquifer’s recharge rates [104], may reduce
its viable use over the long-term.
Over-exploitation of the Guaranı´ may eventually result
in localized and gradual top-to-bottom depletion that may
bring subterranean water levels below what can be feasibly
accessed [105]. While the aquifer in its entirety may not
be in danger of becoming depleted, oversight of consump-
tion is required in order to ensure a continuous, accessible
supply, as only a small percentage of rainfall penetrates
to replenish it. Over the last several decades, changes in
land use above the aquifer as a result of agricultural activity
have significantly decreased the amount of rainfall entering
the system in some regions. The water required for the
production of soy, for example, puts increasing pressure
on it as it continues to be over-drafted [92,106]. In 2007
alone, Brazil’s soybean exports to just fifteen EU countries
contained 11.6 trillion liters (673 km3) of virtual water [107].
If such consumption continues over the coming decades,
recharge rates may be reduced to less than half of natural
levels in some outcrop areas [103,105,108].
The approximate 50% of the Cerrado that remains cov-
ered with native vegetation [109] is critical to the health of
regional hydrology. Deforestation due to agricultural expan-
sion is responsible for a significant decrease in evapotran-
spiration at a local level, though it does not solely account
for all of the recent changes in water balance. Other an-
thropic activities, including irrigation and reservoir creation,
also modify the water balance [7]. Typically, evaporation oc-
curs at a rate of 21% in savannahs. Changes in land cover
type from savannah to pasture and cropland may directly
affect the global water balance, as hotspots of evapotranspi-
ration are reduced because of deforestation, consequently
shifting the location, intensity and timing of rainfall events,
extending dry seasons and altering stream flows [110,111].
Changes in evapotranspiration in the Cerrado also impact
on water levels in Amazon rivers, as water from rivers origi-
nating in the Cerrado account for a large part of the volume
of the Amazon at its mouth [48]. However, absolute con-
sequences of large-scale landscape modification and their
impacts on water balances remain unknown [7] and under-
studied [112]. In addition, the environmental stresses of
economic development and water-related public health risks
make sustainable water management increasingly complex,
particularly as climate change accelerates [113].
9. The Costs of Doing Business: More Than Just a
Dry Spell
Brazil’s climate in the 21st Century can be characterized by
multiple, anthopogenically-driven, acute eco-hydorological
events, in which the Cerrado plays a critical role. The biome
is foundational to much of South America’s water resource
dynamics because it distributes fresh water to the largest
basins, including the Parana´, Tocantins, Paraguai and Sa˜o
Francisco. These watersheds are crucial to the provision
of water supply for humans and non-humans, to maintain-
ing eco-hydrologic functioning, and to providing water for
industry, agriculture and hydroelectric energy production [7].
Extreme drought events in southeastern Brazil (2014–
2017) [114], in Amazonia (2005, 2010, 2016) [115], and
the northeast (2012–2016) [116] are not random climatic
anomalies but are attributable to changes in the water cycle
due to deforestation [117], transformations and commodifi-
cations of waterscapes [118], and failures in land and water
resource management and policies [119]. Declining multi-
year rainfall patterns continue to worsen socio-economic-
environmental relationships. 2018 saw more than 900 of
Brazil’s 5,570 municipalities in a state of water emergency
due to drought [120]. The dry weather patterns of the mete-
orological drought dominating the Cerrado over time have
become a hydrological drought, resulting in agricultural and
socio-economic drought that continues to bring instability
throughout Brazil [121].
In 2014, the Parana´ Basin that supplies the state of Sa˜o
Paulo with water suffered an extreme drought event[114]
which catalyzed a series of dramatic chain-link conse-
quences for the mega-city of Sa˜o Paulo. The drought, the
worst in 80 years, was also linked to climate change caused
by deforestation and the drying up of Brazil’s aerial or ‘fly-
ing rivers’ that are generated in the Amazon Basin [122].
Impacts were compounded by poor planning and bad man-
agement [123], including a loss of up to 30% of all treated
water due to leaks and illegal usage [119]; no recycling pro-
gram for domestic water; and failures on the part of water
resource planning and management sectors to engineer an
interconnected reservoir system that efficiently balances
inventories to meet demand without the emergency draining
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of dams or tapping of aquifer reserves [119].
Between 2014-2015, these factors collectively resulted
in 40-70% of the 20 million people living in greater metropoli-
tan Sa˜o Paulo having their water supply halved and access
periodically disrupted [124]. Many went without tap water for
days at a time, while others opted to leave the city [125,126].
Authorities were forced to drill into the Bauru Sandstone di-
vision of the Guaranı´ Aquifer System in order to pump small
reserves of water into the Cantareira Reservoir System
to supply many of the city’s residents with water, possibly
compromising the amount of available groundwater over
the long-term [127]. Diminished hydropower capacity saw
public services (including electricity, the Internet, and Sa˜o
Paulo’s metro system) cut for multi-day periods [125]. The
increased financial burden carried by electrical distributors
forced them to access more expensive sources of power,
such as thermal and gas, and caused the government to
take out loans from state-run banks to subsidize distribu-
tors’ higher energy expenses, resulting in brownouts and
blackouts and up to a 30% rise in consumer energy costs
[128]. A lack of available drinking water prompted rainwater
hoarding in unsecured containers [129], and periodically
spiked incidents of vector-borne diseases such as Zika and
Dengue [130]. Brazil’s declining zero-to-negative growth in
2015 was estimated to be affected by an additional 1–2%;
36% of all Brazilians faced water supply problems; indus-
try and agriculture were impacted; 40 million people faced
water rationing; electricity rationing affected regions which
account for 60% of the country’s GDP [124]; and inflation
[131] and food prices [132] rose.
Water shortages have also affected the mechanics of
the Sa˜o Francisco River Basin in recent years. The Sa˜o
Francisco is third largest river in the country and the only
major river that starts and finishes in Brazil. Nearly 70%
of the water that feeds the Sa˜o Francisco River originates
in the Cerrado. It is one of the most important river basins
in South America, covering 7.5% of Brazilian territory and
supplying enough water to irrigate 300,000 ha of agricul-
tural land and service 14 million inhabitants in 504 different
municipalities [133]. The Sa˜o Francisco River’s waters are
sequestered at the north end of the Sobradinho reservoir
system in Bahia (the 12th largest reservoir system in the
world). From here, waters are used to enable the surround-
ing drought-prone region to be agriculturally viable and to
feed the Sa˜o Francisco River Integration and Transposi-
tion mega-projects through a 600km+ series of networked
canals that began operating in 2018 to divert 1.4% of Sa˜o
Francisco River water to temporary rivers in drought-prone
arid areas in Northeastern Brazil. The diverted water feeds
industry, agriculture and municipality needs in four states
(Pernambuco, Paraı´ba, Ceara´ and Rio Grande do Norte).
The government is in the process of privatizing the project,
which has massive operating costs (to be met by the states),
and which has been plagued by construction cost overruns,
corruption scandals, and protests from environmental and
civil society organizations [134].
Before the diversion projects, the Sa˜o Francisco River
was already losing water at a rate of 3.3 km3 per annum
(2002-2015) [130]. Levels have been critically depleted for
several consecutive years, and in 2014 the river’s headwa-
ters dried up completely for the first time in history [135].
In 2016, the Sobradino reservoir operated at only 18%
of capacity, a level almost too low to access. In 2017,
the Brazilian water regulator—Ageˆncia Nacional de A´guas
(ANA)—was forced to limit companies’ water abstractions
from the Sa˜o Francisco for several months to combat low
levels due to decreased rainfall [136] and as a consequence
of illegal syphoning for irrigation (an estimated 20 million m3
of water was syphoned in a 2.5 month period) [137].
Cumulative agricultural impacts, changing hydrology pat-
terns, and climate changes that originate on the Cerrado
contribute to impact many of Brazil’s hydrographic regions.
The Tocantins-Araguaia is another at risk. It covers 967
thousand km2 and contains parts of the Amazon and Cer-
rado biomes within its boundaries. This region, much of
it located in an area known as the ‘arc of deforestation,’
is under intense strain from land-use changes relating to
the highly-mechanized farming of soybeans, sugarcane,
and other grains [138]. As agribusiness expands and inten-
sifies, especially with the relaxation of foreign ownership
restrictions [139] and the country on the cusp of its largest
transgenic soy boom yet [140], ongoing water transport
infrastructure investments [141], water conflicts [100], en-
ergy insecurity [142], and environmental health concerns
all continue to amplify.
10. The Overuse of Agrotoxins
The cultivation of GM soy has resulted in the growing con-
sumption of a generation of agrotoxins that are increasingly
responsible for numerous environmental health problems
[30,143–146]. In 2003, with the introduction of GM crops
into Brazil, the country’s use of agrotoxins increased by more
than 200% [145]. This figure continues to rise at an an-
nual rate of approximately 15%, more than double the global
rate [147]. Since 2008, Brazil has become one of the largest
users of agrotoxins in the world, consuming 20% of the global
supply [145], with the majority being used on transgenic soy
[148]. Though the use of pesticide on soy is intensifying,
soy shows extremely low gains in productivity from its use,
displaying a 1:13 percentage point (pp) ratio. In comparison,
two other GM crops that account for Brazil’s major pesti-
cide consumption—corn and cotton—show an approximate
1:1 pp productivity ratio [149]. This demonstrates that soy
production is not effectively enhanced from increased pesti-
cide use but rather it contributes to the cumulative growth of
nation-wide agrotoxin consumption, which is increasing at a
rate higher than overall crop productivity [149].
In 2013, Brazilians purchased in excess of $10 billion
worth of agrotoxins [147] prepared almost entirely by just six
companies—Bayer, Syngenta, BASF, Monsanto, Dow, and
Dupont—the same transnational corporations that control
all the GM crops grown globally for commercial purposes
[145]. Poor regulatory oversight [150] around the indus-
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try has made Brazil an attractive market for more than
400 types of pesticides that are banned in other countries
[147,148]. In 2015, Brazil planted 21 predominant crops
over 71.2 million hectares. Soy accounted for 42% of the
country’s total planted area (32.2 million hectares) and used
the most pesticides, accounting for 63% of the total, around
207 million liters [151]. The most used active ingredient is
glyphosate, that accounts for approximately 5.2-+5.5 liters
per hectare [152].
By 2015, it was estimated that each and every Brazilian
was ingesting 7.3 liters of agrotoxins per year [153]. The pri-
mary pesticide pathways to surface and groundwater occur
through wind drift as a result of aerial spraying, runoff from
agricultural fields in areas where riparian vegetation has
been depleted, and leaching through soil macropores [30].
Though drinking water monitoring data is far from compre-
hensive [154], some grain-producing areas in the Cerrado
[155] have detected pesticides in the Guaranı´ aquifer and
wells—in concentrations that exceed Brazil’s minimal water
quality limits [156]. The absence of controls on well designs
and closures may cause some wells to operate as open
channels for surface contamination. It is presumed that
further contamination is occurring, especially in vulnerable
outcrop areas [156,157].
The extensive areas of high pesticide consumption are
mainly located in the Cerrado [151]. Reports in connection
to acute and chronic pesticide poisoning have escalated
over the years [146,148,158]. In 2006, the Lucas do Rio
Verde municipality in Mato Grosso (population 55,000) expe-
rienced toxic rains as a result of plantation crop fumigation
with Paraquat, a herbicide used in the drying of soy for
harvest [145]. Subsequent health studies conducted be-
tween 2007 and 2010 in the same municipality discovered
contamination in 83% of drinking water supplies in drinking
water wells, and in two lagoons, as well as in the blood of
toads (congenital malformations in these toads were found
to be four times more prevalent than those observed in a
control lagoon). Glyphosate, pyrethroids, and organochlo-
rines were found in the urine and blood of 88% of teachers
sampled in the region’s municipal schools, and in 100% of
samples of women’s breast milk [145].
Nationwide health indicators show a positive correlation
between the consumption of pesticides, fetal malforma-
tion, and chronic childhood cancer in areas predominantly
planted with soybeans, corn and sugarcane crops [151],
with the intensity of agricultural production and pesticide
use proportional to sites of environmental pollution [159].
4,003 cases of agricultural pesticide poisoning, or almost
11 a day, were reported nationwide in 2017, including 148
deaths [160]. The level of glyphosate present in GM soy has
been found to be 19,500 times higher than the level found to
have estrogenic effects on breast cancer cells in vitro [161],
a level even Monsanto admits is “extreme” [162]. These
issues are part of a landscape of environmental violence
that is structured by a meagerly enforced legal regulatory
framework that continues to be both shaped and threatened
by Brazil’s powerful agricultural lobby [147].
One of many recent attempts to relax agrotoxin regula-
tions came in June 2018, through a special committee that
approved a report recommending the adoption of what has
come to be known as the Poison Bill [163]. The agrotoxin
regulatory process is currently overseen by the Ministries
of Agriculture, Health and the Environment, however if the
bill is passed into law, it will transfer oversight directly to the
Ministry of Agriculture. It will also lift bans on agrotoxins
that are currently prohibited and reduce the testing period
for newly introduced pesticides to two years (from five),
whereupon registration could be automatically authorized.
The bill also proposes that products containing teratogenic,
carcinogenic or mutagenic properties should be analyzed
only if they are considered dangerous to human health, but
Brazilian institutions lack the resources to conduct such
analyses [164].
Even though the external costs of pesticide usage—to
the environment and to human health—are being brought
into questions [18], long-standing institutions such as
Brazil’s National Council for Food and Nutrition Security
are being abolished (the Council was eliminated on the
first day Jair Bolsonaro took presidential office) [165]. In
January 2019, 40 new products containing pesticides, in-
cluding 28 new registrations of pesticides as their primary
ingredient were approved for sale (12 were approved within
a week of Bolsonaro taking office).
Decades ago, Rachel Carson identified the victims of
pesticide poisoning as those who “assume the risks that
the insect controllers calculate” [166]. This is certainly true
in Brazil, in a scenario that may be most tersely character-
ized as a measure of what Michael Watts describes as the
“violent geographies of fast capitalism” [167]. Still, pesticide
use and impact remain only part of any sustainability or
environmental justice equation. Eco-responsibility means
different things to different experts and different stakehold-
ers. Pesticide levels, productivity per acre, water usage and
quality, and an array of other scientifically measurable and
qualitative factors are part of complex, value-based ideolo-
gies that build narratives to constitute or defend dialectic
perspectives on what sustainable agriculture means and
how it can be achieved.
11. Agribusiness & the Politics of Selective Policies
Brazilian institutions mediate economic and social change
and structure key land use change on the Cerrado by deter-
mining how and where natural resources are exploited and
who benefits from them, in what Jepson and Brannstrom
(2010) have described as “access regimes” [66]. The envi-
ronmental costs of agribusiness, in terms of deforestation,
have been justified by calculating that the dollar profit de-
rived both directly and indirectly from the agriculture sector
surpasses the dollar trade value of CO2-e emitted through
land clearings [29]. The ecological worth of the Cerrado is
commodified and assessed by a development perspective
that values the growth of primary goods production for ex-
port over maintaining the integrity of the carbon sink and
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the natural resources that provide for maintaining global hu-
man security in a rapidly warming planet. The agricultural
$profit > carbon sink value is not a logical trade-off platform
on which to secure either ecological stability for the biome
or build a sustainable agricultural future, but a feature of
accumulation by agricultural dispossession [168].
Mega-farming poses huge challenges for agricultural,
ecosystem and hydrological sustainability, with climate
change due to deforestation on the Cerrado agricultural
frontier emerging as a prime factor [169]. The conversion
of forests to pastures and cropland has decreased annual
mean evapotranspiration in the biome by approximately one
third [64,68,169–171] and increased sensible heat fluxes
and surface temperatures by 3–5◦ C [169,171,172]. By
2050, climate change is expected to cause water scarcity,
dramatic drops in key crop yields and steep increases in
their prices [173–175].
Large-scale mechanized soy production has been shown
to reduce poverty indicators, raise median rural incomes
and lead to increases in the Gini coefficient and the Human
Development Index in soy-producing municipalities [176].
However, it also leads to more inequality [176,177], is im-
munized by technological processes, and incentivized by
low-cost chemical registration, subsidies, and low taxes
for agrotoxin manufacturers. These, and other agribusi-
ness incentives, engineered by the Brazil’s agricultural lobby
and explosive industry growth, exploit fragilities in environ-
mental legislation in favor of chemical-dependent farming
[147,151,160,163]. Large-scale agriculture receives the
lion’s share of total public agricultural expenditure, dispensed
in the form of credit lines, insurance, minimum price guar-
antees/deficiency payments and technological innovation
transfers [178,179]. However, of the 9.5% of farms that
accounted for 86% of total production value in 2006 (last
statistics available), the majority were small- and medium-
sized [8]. Still, their contributions are marginalized by main-
stream political processes[180–183] and thus, four million
small farm units have been eliminated from the market [184]
by excluding them from access to technology, credit, and
insurance. Conversely, disproportionate support for large-
scale farms has allowed them access to the international
market at a higher price and provided them with the tools to
negotiate lower costs inputs with suppliers [184].
Consolidation of land and water resources is central
to Brazil’s neo-extractive economy of state-led agricultural
development and is an intrinsic result of an ongoing histori-
cal process that supports a highly concentrated system of
land ownership [92,185,186]. Brazil has one of the most
unequal land structures in the world, with just 1.5% of rural
land owners effectively occupying more than half of Brazil’s
agricultural lands [187]. Large-scale landholders that con-
trol the majority of land use on the Cerrado and other rural
areas of Brazil are politically organized through a power-
ful agricultural lobby—bancada ruralista (rural bench)—a
caucus of politicians representing rural interests [20].
The rural bench consists of 228 lawmakers, which make
up 44% of Brazil’s lower house of congress and more than
25% of the senate. The leader of the bancada ruralistas is
Blairo Maggi—head of the Amaggi Group (Brazil’s largest
soy producing family) and currently federal former minister
[188]. The bancada caucus is a key influencer of federal
policies that shape environmental protections and promote
agribusiness agendas. In a society that is 86% urban, ban-
cada ruralistas wield extraordinary power over the political
system by promoting policies that keep agribusiness as the
steadfast of the country’s economic epicenter. Brazil’s recent
President, Michel Temer, survived two congressional votes
on whether he should face trial for corruption, in large part
due to the backing of the ruralistas [189,190].
Temer’s administration passed or attempted to pass a
series of laws that benefit agribusiness and accelerate de-
forestation. Among them is provisional measure 759/2016
[191], dubbed the ‘land-grabber’s law’, a series of land regu-
larizations that ease acquisition of legal title by legitimizing
and fast-tracking the transference of public assets (land)
and natural resources to private interests (at low or zero
cost) without any social or collective interest criteria [192].
The government also proposed to reduce or eliminate en-
vironmental licensing and proposal requirements for infras-
tructure projects [193–195], worked to reduce the size of
conservation reserves [196] and deforestation monitoring
[197], weakened Indigenous rights [198] by essentially dis-
mantling the bureau of Indian affairs [199], and opened
Indigenous territories to mining and agribusiness [200–202].
The 2018 election of Temer’s far right successor, Jair Bol-
sonaro, signals even more disturbing policies that threaten
socio-ecological protections for both the Amazon and the
Cerrado. Bolsonaro has declared that the Ministry for Agri-
culture and the Ministry for the Environment will merge and
that the Ministry for the Environment will be subjugated
to the authority of the Ministry for Agriculture. Bolsonaro
also campaigned to dismantle NGOs [203], to jail or ex-
ile adversaries and those on the political left[204], and to
quash activism [205]—with explicit qualification that “Shiite
environmental activism” and the “Indian land demarcation
industry” will not be tolerated [206]. He has further stated
he will abolish the demarcation of Indigenous and quilom-
bola lands [207], and considers land occupations terrorist
acts that may be legitimately suppressed by extrajudicial,
lethal means [208].
11.1. Foreign Ownership and Transnational Issues
With the introduction of Bolsonaro’s policies, agribusiness
is set to be fast-tracked with even fewer environmental con-
straints. Soybeans have historically played a central role
in advancing transnational agribusiness in Brazil. State-
led colonization projects such as Prodecer [94,209,210];
a world food crisis and the 2008 financial crisis that was
connected to it [211] which consolidated food security with
financial returns [212]; and the market liberalization and
privatization gains made during the commodity boom 2007–
2014, brought a swell of private/foreign capital to develop
global supply chains [213].
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Global trade liberalization under the WTO has stimu-
lated trade links between Brazil and China and Brazil and
Europe. China’s liberalization of soybean imports has made
it the world’s largest importer of soybeans—with more than
half coming from Brazil. The extraordinary growth in the
industry has been magnified by the large-scale replacement
of alternative forms of edible vegetable oils and meal for
animal feed with soy products [214,215]. With record yields
and profits and the trade war between the US and China,
Brazil is on track to become an even larger soy exporter
[216,217]. Much of the challenge is being met by expand-
ing river transportation infrastructure [218,219], enabled by
the support of various public and private Dutch interests
[220], to make it viable to get soybeans to port through
a northern corridor. Low-interest, often-subsidized credit
lines, available through national development banks and
subsidized availability of productive technologies, have also
made soy extremely profitable and fueled both its expansion
and intensification.
Moving forward, development will remain dependent
on financialization, subsidization, access to cheap land,
lax restrictions on foreign ownership, construction of new
infrastructure (highways, river channels and ports), tech-
nological advancements (fertilizers, pesticides, and agri-
mechanization processes), deforestation, intensification
and water diversion. The socio-environmental costs are
huge. The northern corridor is expected to create massive
socio-ecological disruptions by increasing deforestation,
logging, environmental pollution, foreign land occupation
and violence between local and Indigenous populations
and large landowners [220]. Similarly, soy expansion in
Matopiba has resulted in mass dispossession, where the
appropriation of public lands for soy cultivation have been
legitimized through sophisticated forms of territorial transfer
and control [94]. Here soy cultivation increased by 253%
from 2000 to 2014, to cover 3.4 million hectares [9]. Accord-
ing to a 2018 policy briefing analysis [221,222], between
2009 and 2013, 70% of direct soy deforestation in the Cer-
rado took place in just fifteen municipalities of the Matopiba
region [223]. Between 57% and 90% of this soy is produced
for the export market and has direct and indirect impacts
on ecosystem services, especially water provision [221].
Brazil’s 2013 irrigation law [224] is key in incentivizing public
and private irrigation projects that facilitate intensification and
expansion. The law follows a 2009 recommendation by the
World Bank that claims production growth will be achieved by:
“...providing investors with greater flexibility, since, to a
greater or lesser extent, they would allow for (i) the consoli-
dation of the irrigation service through agricultural occupa-
tion within one large company or a vertical consortium of
companies; or (ii) free negotiation, under a market scheme,
between the irrigation service provider and agricultural pro-
ducers. This freedom could be perceived by investors as an
indicator of lower risk, since these investors would have con-
trol over the selection of their partners, consortium members,
and contracted parties, free from new bidding procedures.
Guarantees for payments, tariffs (or prices), and implemen-
tation or occupation terms would be freely negotiated by the
parties, within their sphere of private negotiation” [225].
Cerrado regions with a high concentration of irrigated
areas are dangerously reducing water supplies and gener-
ating conflicts for those that live in basin areas constantly
under threat from water overuse [226,227]. Estimated to
be 3.5 times more productive than rain-fed agriculture, ir-
rigation allows estimated economic gains up to seven- or
eight-fold greater [228]. However, the growth of intensifi-
cation facilitated by irrigation also brings water insecurity
with it. Though current soy output in Mato Grosso (which
has been aggressively deforested and now produces pri-
marily through intensification) still relies almost exclusively
on rain-fed systems, irrigated systems will nonetheless play
an important role moving forward. With irrigation, soybeans
can be planted one month earlier and irrigated until the
start of the wet season, allowing for an earlier harvest and,
potentially, a fully irrigated dry season crop. Increasing irri-
gation not only increases annual water vapor transfer to the
atmosphere through evapotranspiration at the expense of
surface and groundwater, it also requires expanding infras-
tructure to facilitate it [229].
Intensified production of GM soy, which made up 96% of
soy cultivated in Brazil in 2016 [230], together with an irrigated
dry season crop and heavy agrotoxin use [231], reinforces a
pro-growth perception that is tied to a market logic which ratio-
nalizes negative socio-environmental impacts and trade-offs
[232–234] and raises conservation costs [232].
Approximately 30% of all lands available for crop expan-
sion are located in Latin America and by 2050 approximately
80% of intensified production worldwide is expected to rely on
irrigated agriculture [235]. Thus, South America’s water supply
paradox is apt to become more pronounced with calculations
suggesting that 60% of all accessible blue water (freshwater)
would have to be appropriated for agriculture [235] to meet
the projected demands of intensification globally—an unsus-
tainable proposition that will increase pressure on terrestrial
and aquatic ecosystems, and traditional cultures and livelihood
systems that struggle to survive on already-stressed common
property (land, water, forests and fishing).
Much socio-ecological security in Brazil, however, is ul-
timately determined by the green water stored in the soils
of the Cerrado. Its abundance or scarcity and the linkages
between green and blue water flows are inextricably tied
to a healthy ecology and water cycle. As regional hydrol-
ogy patterns are altered, and climate change accelerates,
gradual changes in political ecologies will be forced to rec-
oncile the differences between institutional and corporate
interests and the interdependencies between economic and
environmental realities. The already high social costs will
be higher and will amplify already long-standing conflicts
with established agribusiness practices.
12. A Difficult Path Forward
There is an accepted philosophical position in contemporary
society whereby if an institutional agent has the capacity,
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power, and resources to aid in solving a problem, they have
a responsibility to do so [236,237]. However, ethical imper-
atives are based on moral and political complexities that
require applying a series of judgements, legal or otherwise,
that in practical usage are often in dialectic opposition to
one another—played out in various assemblages of con-
tradictory regulatory and trade frameworks at sub-national,
national and international levels [238].
Environmental ethics posit that the intrinsic value of nat-
ural resources and environmental costs must be included
in the evaluation of capital investments in development and
sector policy, yet these evaluations almost exclusively occur
through cost-benefit analyses in which minimizing economic
cost typically remains the central, controlling, and diluting
measure for environmental threat assessment [239]. The
ethical responsibilities relating to climate change may be
more difficult to ignore in coming decades because of the
interrelated societal consequentialism that is compounding
impacts on multiple simultaneous levels. These impacts
are already reconceptualizing how responsibilities can be
assigned to address accelerating environmental problems.
Agribusiness on the Cerrado comes at the expense of
biotic, aquatic, traditional, and Indigenous life, all of which
have been relegated to surviving in conservation fragments
interspersed between private lands and ultimately threat-
ened by extinction. Such a dilemma was theorized decades
ago by Aldo Leopold in his seminal essay The Land Ethic
(1949). Leopold contended that government conservation
efforts would eventually be crippled by an unbalanced sys-
tem based solely on economic self-interest, which would
ignore (to the point of elimination) land community elements
that lack commercial value but that are intrinsic to healthy
function. He further queried that if ethical obligations are
not materially assigned to the private landowner, who would
carry the “eventual ramifications”? [240] Climate change is
emerging as a peripheral argument that may be central to
dispensing such responsibility.
By 2017, there were more than 1,200 climate change or
climate change-relevant laws in place worldwide [241]. Ex-
isting national and international laws cover a large portion
of the globe, however, there remains a need to strengthen
and enforce legislation and fill gaps in existent laws. Even
with climate change as a peripheral issue (in 77% of suits,
climate change is a partial or motivating argument) [241],
the judiciary is increasingly confronted by disputes involving
climate change-related issues. Such cases aimed at estab-
lishing regulatory protections are becoming more frequent.
Climate change is yet to be used as a central strategy
to litigate against agribusiness-related GHG contributions,
however, as a peripheral argument they are emerging. A
2018 lawsuit was lodged by an environmental advocacy
group against the German government for its complicity
in failing to curb nitrates from seeping into groundwater,
mostly as the result of factory farming operations [242–244].
The strategy aims to force an emissions cap on methane
production, and thus reduce overall farm sizes. These sorts
of actions could, theoretically, become instrumental in alter-
ing the course of livestock feed production, transportation
and imports. Thus, the links connecting industrial farming
become vulnerable as they are exposed to climate change
litigation, if only as a peripheral argument [245,246].
Most successful climate change litigation decisions tend
to favor pro-regulatory positions involving energy efficiency
or renewable energy technologies [247–249]. Using renew-
able energy to replace fuels made from cash crops such
as soy are already taking the form of pro-regulatory rec-
ommendations that are more frequently finding their way
into agriculture and energy policy recommendations and
blueprints globally [250–254]. These shifts in the energy
landscape may eventually have ramifications for interna-
tional commodity trading. Incorporating climate change
mitigation measures into crop insurance and conservation
compliance programs, and building emissions reduction and
carbon sequestration caps into agriculture bills may also be
a method for government to assign corporate responsibility.
Other internationally spearheaded conservation efforts
[255] are underway to create legal recognition of the rights
of nature [256] and governmental duties of care. Constitu-
tional amendments and bills that champion these concepts
have been adopted in Mexico City [257] and are tabled in
Argentina [258] and Europe [259]. New Zealand has im-
bued a number of its rivers and forests with personhood
rights, India has declared personhood rights for the Ganges
River, and a 2018 ruling by the Columbian Supreme Court
imbued sovereign Amazon forest with personhood right and
declared that the federal government has a resulting duty to
protect it. Going further, Bolivia and Ecuador have passed
legislation granting all nature equal rights to humans [260].
Among these jurisdictions that have developed concepts of
environmental personhood, applications and understand-
ings of it are diverse.
As the concept becomes more widely applied, envi-
ronmental personhood may be the next line of attack for
redressing environmental protection policies that arguably
fail in their care of duty. The concept could prove useful
for another challenge [261] to Brazil’s revised 2012 Forest
Code—a set of controversial laws that regulate land use
and management on private properties. It is of particular im-
portance because 76% of rural landholdings in Brazil exist
on private land and 80% of regions converted to soybean
plantations have occurred in areas that are permitted by the
FC [262], much of it by removing native vegetation from Cer-
rado lands [9]. FC revisions also grant select amnesty for
illegal deforestation, reduce standards for conservation and
restoration by up to 78% in some areas [9,263], and reduce
Areas of Permanent Protection—some of which are located
in headwaters, lakes and rivers in areas of strategic impor-
tance for agribusiness—which are crucial for maintaining
water supplies and preventing climate disasters.
The common law public trust doctrine (PTD), central to
environmental law, is also being advanced as a ground for
compelling regulation of GHG emissions [264,265] through
judicial means [266]. Brazil has no judicial interpretation
of the public trust doctrine but has constitutional provisions
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(including articles 5, 20, 23, 24, 225) that embrace its prin-
ciples [267], which could be legally applied to protect the
Cerrado irrespective of its commercial value.
Under international law, the Precautionary Principle
[268–270] may be used to stop the use of technological
enhancements for short-term economic gains at the ex-
pense of future generations if environmental damage by
one nation state causes serious and irreversible conse-
quences to another. The principle is often cited in official
documents pertaining to international environmental com-
mitments and may be useful to consider in regard to issues
pertaining to Brazil’s disproportionate over-drafting of the
Guaranı´ Aquifer, or applied to slow land use conversion
that can be definitively linked to hydrology changes in
neighboring nation states, as crop production is directly
achieved through the aid of technological enhancements
such as GM production methods enabled by technical in-
vestment and financing sectors. This argument may also,
theoretically, be invoked to block the uptake of the ‘Cer-
rado Miracle’ in cases such as Mozambique’s controversial
ProSavana initiative [271–273].
Over the last decade, chemical pesticide manufacturing
industries have increasingly become a target of litigation.
Law suits are more frequently finding ways into the court
to hold agribusiness accountable for the environmental
consequences of their operations, especially in regards
to the ethical concerns about the culture of pesticides as-
sociated with GM crop production, including their links to
climate change vulnerability [274,275], public health, eco-
logical damage, negative impacts on traditional farming
practices, and excessive corporate dominance [276]. In
Brazil, laws are being introduced to regulate how pesti-
cides are transported and handled [277,278], and a 2018
federal ruling has temporarily suspended the registration
of new pesticides until a toxicity evaluation is completed
[279]. This is despite the rural bench’s attempts to pass
the poison law and ban the sale of organic produce in su-
permarkets domestically, which would disproportionately
affect small-scale farmers [280].
The Landless Workers Movement (MST) is the largest
and most mobilized social justice and agrarian reform move-
ment representing small-scale stakeholders effected by mul-
tiple agricultural stressors [92,93,281–288]. MST is mostly
composed of farmers, working people, Indigenous peoples,
those living on quilombos and local communities who rely
on small-scale and subsistence farming and fishing [289].
The MST aims to legally compel government to appropri-
ate and distribute mostly abandoned lands to those living in
poverty [290]. The lands are often rehabilitated into cooper-
ative farms that are managed sustainably by families [291].
Correlating human rights protections with climate change
mitigation and impacts [292] may prove useful as an emerg-
ing strategy for movements such as the MST to extend
their power and redress unjust laws and labor practices,
including those that are equated with slavery [293,294].
Most commonly, slave labor in Brazil is used to clear
land for agriculture. For example, in the soy frontier of Mato
Grosso and Para´, for the years 2003 and 2004, almost
8,700 incidences of slavery were reported by government
[295]. To counter this, initiatives could legally organize
around the concept of a ‘just transitions law’ to realize a
lower carbon economy by bringing together environmental
and labor laws in approaches that link worker-based hu-
man trafficking and rights organizations [296] with climate
change legislation, sustainability practices, and Indigenous
and small farmer land tenure security [297]. As yet, such
policies remain under-explored in legal literature [298] but
may over time coalesce to bring pressure to agribusiness
producers, multinational buyers, and mega-supermarket
chains to adhere to better labor, sustainable production,
and transparency practices.
Other initiatives, though presenting their own integrity
issues, are a step toward advancing sustainability in multi-
directional supply chains. These include fair trade [299]
and organic certification practices [300], Indigenous food
production systems [301] and carbon security initiatives.
In 2018, Netherlands-based Louis Dreyfus Company an-
nounced it will become the first major commodity trader
to stop buying soy from newly deforested land specifically
in the Cerrado [302]. However, there are few transparent
methods with which to trace the integrity of supply chains.
For example, major associations like the Round Table on
Responsible Soy (RTRS) certify using a book and claim
chain of custody system [303] that offers little transparency.
Another sector gaining traction is the sustainable, re-
sponsible and impact (SRI) investment sector, a growing
area which has received an influx of money since the Paris
Climate Agreement. The capacity of SRI lies in both divest-
ment and reinvestment. Though reinvestments are vulnera-
ble to greenwashing—for example, consider the criticisms
levelled at the RTRS [304]—the SRI sector is an indicator
of the public’s desire to support sustainability goals.
Reallocation of capital, together with changing public
attitude is, however, becoming more influential in reforming
agriculture and fighting climate change [305,306]. For ex-
ample, at the 2014 UN Climate Summit, Norway, Germany
and the UK pledged to support public procurement policies
for sustainably sourced products like soy and to encour-
age deforestation-free supply chains [307], and Norway’s
action plan presented by parliament in 2016 argued the
government need exercise due care for the protection of
biodiversity in its global pension fund investments [308].
What matters with these sorts of commitments is policy
longevity. For example, in 2015, Norway paid $1 billion to
Brazil [309] for fulfilling a 2008 agreement between the two
countries to prevent deforestation. At the time, the deal
[310] resulted in the largest global emissions cut over the
lifespan of the agreement [311]. However the victory was
short-lived, and came at the expense of Cerrado lands and
waters [302]. This scenario is useful to examine for two
reasons. Firstly, with deforestation again soaring [312–314],
this scenario illustrates how Brazil leverages its sovereign
natural resources for monetary gain. Secondly, international
attention has always concentrated on saving the iconic
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Amazon rainforest, whereas the largely unknown Cerrado
suffers from an image problem that doesn’t represent the
popular vision of a carbon sink or priority conservation area
[315]. Though it’s possible that the Cerrado’s public profile
has been marginally raised through the recently publicized
‘Cerrado Manifesto’, there is no evidence to suggest that
this market pledge [316] is anything more than corporate
greenwashing [317].
One measure which could prove useful as an ethical
evaluation metric is virtual water. Brazil is a sizeable ex-
porter of virtual water [318]. Though the water footprint of
crop production for export varies greatly between regions
in Brazil, the concept could be used to establish new re-
sponsibility guidelines. Industrial animal farming (and its
relationship to imported feed) is the most water-intensive
and water polluting form of meat production, therefore, cal-
culating the virtual water footprints of nations by including
the impact of livestock feed imports might be another av-
enue through which to introduce a resource consumption
cap. Additionally, if large consumers such as China and the
EU withdrew their oilseed commitments under the current
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, they could potentially be
freed up to establish domestic production of more varied
livestock feeds (such as the EU produced in the 1990s)
without policy limitations [319].
There is an emerging view that replicable models of
sustainable management of tropical forested lands may be
found within the knowledge systems of contemporary Indige-
nous peoples [320]. Indigenous knowledge is increasingly
being recognized as an important source of knowledge in
regard to climate change and adaptation [99,321]. This sug-
gests that climate change is emerging as a battleground
strategy that may also be used to strengthen Indigenous
rights and protections. Indigenous land management sys-
tems are increasingly considered a legitimate right of Indige-
nous people, and their information and knowledge systems
for managing climate change are becoming progressively
more valued [322,323]. In Brazil, a 37-year analysis deter-
mined that Indigenous land management techniques of the
Xavante were responsible for rebuilding ecological integrity
and sustaining vegetation recovery in Cerrado regions that
had been deforested by agribusiness [324]. Several Indige-
nous initiatives [325] are active in combating issues associ-
ated with mono-cropping—including deforestation, biodiver-
sity loss, water pollution, and the erosion of rights. These
movements may be further aided by the concept of intergen-
erational equity [326] that is embedded in modern interna-
tional environmental law. Legal guidelines established by
the World Heritage Convention also define a State’s obliga-
tion to protect and conserve cultural and natural heritage for
future generations [327]. The International Union for Conser-
vation of Nature Environmental Law Centre [255,328] has
developed a body of conservation tools and resources for
establishing and strengthening this legal framework [329].
Biodiversity conservation, recognized as crucial for miti-
gating climate change [330], is beginning to receive renewed
attention. At the 2018 UN Conference on Biodiversity, a
coalition of Indigenous groups from across Latin America
called for the creation of the world’s largest protected area
to stretch from Mexico through Brazil. Another legal proposi-
tion has proposed extending the country’s soy moratorium
in the Amazon to include the Cerrado region [331]. The pro-
posal would prohibit providing credit or buying soybeans from
producers who grow in deforested areas. Long-standing con-
stitutional amendments bills such as PEC 115/95 and PEC
504/2010 also propose the Cerrado be considered national
heritage. It is improbable that any of these measures will
be adopted anytime soon by congress, and with Bolsonaro
leading Brazil it is imperative that new strategies proposing
systemic environmental protections be pushed.
Actions that confront climate change may be rooted in
ethical issues of responsibility, yet they present a direct threat
to the fundamental values of neoliberal capitalism. As such,
they stand facing the “perfect moral storm” [332]—confronted
by political philosophies that obfuscate science, fail to rec-
ognize the value of non-human life, prioritize the commodity
value of nature, and operate in climates of corruption and un-
der the judicial auspices of business as usual [237,333]. Still,
in the near future, agribusiness may be challenged by what
oil corporations are dealing with now—where municipal- and
state-level legal efforts, sustained activism, and an evolution
in communications campaigning are bringing more pressure
to bear on industry’s role in climate change.
Brazil’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDC), pledged at the Paris Climate Conference, focused
on the agricultural sector’s commitments to mitigate global
warming, [334,335] yet achievements fall below stated targets
[336,337]. Climate change mitigation protocols exist for de-
signing, assessing and reporting national and sub-national
goals in relation to reducing agriculture’s GHG emissions
[338], and in some countries, climate change litigation has
served as a successful strategy with which to enforce targets
[241]. Brazil may, theoretically, be challenged to uphold its
international pledges through the constitutional principle of
sustainable development [339,340] in accordance with the Na-
tional Policy for Climate Change (NPCC) [341,342]. However,
the manipulation of data [336], the abandonment of defor-
estation control policies, President Jair Bolsonaro’s threat to
withdraw from the Climate Paris Accord [343], and weighted
political support for predatory agricultural practices have de-
railed Brazil’s contribution to a >2◦ C world [344].
Environmental protection measures can be circumvented
through loopholes in forestry cover mandates and emis-
sions trade-offs, codes, and tax incentive schemes such as
Brazil’s Payment for Environmental Services, Environmental
Reserve Quotas, Private Natural Heritage Reserves, the For-
est Code (FC), the Ecological Value Added Tax, or the Low
Carbon Agriculture (ABC) program. In some cases, these
schemes are already used to manipulate forest cover quotas
by preserving vegetation fragments where alternative use
value is low [345] to enable private deforestation to legally
occur [346], or to support measures that promote business-
as-usual approaches to farming. For example, the National
Policy on Integration of Farming, Livestock and Forestry law
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[347], which seeks to mitigate deforestation, is managed un-
der the ABC program. The ABC is problematic because early
on its policies were relaxed to allow farmers and ranchers to
use ABC credit lines to purchase cattle, remove tree stumps
from recently deforested lands, and increase the number of
cattle that ranchers can graze per hectare. Thus, ABC may
lead to further deforestation in remote and vegetated areas
through incentivizing predatory land speculation [348,349].
In another case, environmental protections were quashed
through a decision by the Supreme Court to overrule a munic-
ipal regulation that had banned fire as a sugarcane harvest-
ing method [342]. These examples underscore that Brazil’s
environmental protections [350] are frequently undermined
by agribusiness interests, corruption, and violence [351].
Brazil is the most threatening place in the world to ad-
vocate for territorial and environmental rights. Between
2002 and 2013, at least 448 environmentalists were killed
throughout the country, a number which equals approxi-
mately half of all environmentalists murdered globally dur-
ing the same period. Around 40% of those were Indigenous
peoples involved in disputes over natural resources [352].
In 2016, Brazil again ranked first in deaths over land rights
disputes and the protection of the environment, holding the
position for the 14th consecutive year, with 49 recorded
deaths for 2016 [353]. In the time period since 2000, about
a million families have been threatened by agribusiness
conflicts [354]. With the political intolerance and violent
threats continually being levelled at Brazil’s Indigenous and
landless populations, and what essentially amounts to the
elimination of Brazil’s Ministry for the Environment, multi-
pronged, ethics-based legal pressure is one of the few
avenues that remain open as a viable means of fighting for
the environmental protection of the Cerrado and its peoples.
13. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the ecological and hydrological
importance of the Cerrado and explicated how the biome
is at risk due to massive land-use change produced by
large-scale, mechanized soy production and other forms of
agribusiness that drives deforestation on an immense scale.
It describes how this has changed hydrological patterns and
threatens water security in key ways. It has illustrated a po-
litical ecology at a national level that engineers agricultural
policies to disproportionately favor large-scale landholders
at the expense of environmental integrity and human se-
curity. It considers social and economic ramifications that
trace back to changes in water resources and rainfall pat-
terns. It exposes how the market and state act in concert to
channel wealth through a globalized agribusiness culture,
and finally, suggests considering a pathway forward that
confronts the challenges presented by the ‘perfect storm’
of oligarchical political control and climate change, which
threaten sustainability as never before.
Brazil is projected to experience the largest global in-
crease in agricultural production over the next four decades
[355]. It is unclear how simultaneous changes in the Cer-
rado’s native vegetation structure, precipitation patterns,
and climate change will interact to affect land and water re-
sources over time as a result of the impact of soy and other
large-scale agribusiness enterprises. Evidence suggests
that reduced deforestation and increased agricultural pro-
duction can occur simultaneously in Brazil’s frontier region,
but that this is contingent on policies that promote inten-
sification on already-cleared lands while restricting defor-
estation [356]. It is doubtful, however, that government- and
industry-led policies will control deforestation as the market
begins to favor another boom in expansion. The country
may be able to meet demands for increased crop acreage
through 2040 by intensification, however it is unlikely this
will be achieved without further disruption to rainfall pat-
terns or ecological stability. With Brazil holding 12-16% of
all freshwater reserves globally, protecting water integrity
must be considered a matter of urgent national security,
one that must be recognized as a complex fabric of inter-
related causes, vulnerability, and impacts associated with
globalization and Brazil’s agribusiness industry.
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